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Tax projections in German states –  
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Abstract 
This paper analyses the accuracy of the tax projections of West German states from a public 
choice perspective. It argues that state governments have the possibility and face incentives to 
manipulate tax projections. Evidence for the years 1992 – 2002 reveals a general upward bias 
in tax projections in election as well as non-election years. The degree of overestimation is 
higher, the less popular the incumbent party is. Partisanship and elections have no significant 
influence. To improve external control of state governments in the budget process, the process 
of tax projections must be made transparent. 
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1. Introduction 
The fiscal discipline in democracies crucially depends on the public and parliamentary control 
over the budget and the institutional restrictions governments have to follow when putting up 
and executing the budget (e.g., von Hagen and Harden, 1994; Alesina and Perotti, 1996). 
Among other things, effective public and parliamentary control requires reliable projections for 
the expected tax revenues (e.g., Auerbach, 1996 and 1999). In Germany, the “Arbeitskreis 
Steuerschätzung” (AKS), a specially installed committee, is in charge of tax projections. Its 
projections are recognized to be fairly accurate and unbiased. The reliability of these projec-
tions originates in the line up of AKS as well as its far-reaching independence (e.g., von der 
Lippe, 1998; Gebhardt, 2001). The AKS estimates are published and represent a binding input 
for the budget process on the federal level. In this respect, the public as well as the parliament 
are given the necessary means to control the budget process (e.g., von Hagen and Harden, 
1994). On the state level, however, governments are merely presented an unpublished and 
unbinding projection. They are free to adjust these projections according to their own informa-
tion or beliefs (e.g., Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2003). This lack of transparency gives 
state government the possibility to manipulate the expected sum of tax revenues used in the 
budget process according to their own preferences (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996). This in 
turn raises the question whether state governments in Germany will make use of this possibil-
ity and if so, what are the results of these manipulations.   
The current paper provides first empirical evidence on this question. Section 2 starts by outlin-
ing the degree of fiscal autonomy and the central role of tax projections in the budgetary proc-
ess in German states. Next, it briefly sketches the procedure of tax projection in Germany. The 
illustrations will show that the state government has considerable influence on the tax projec-
tion used in the budget process. Based on literature on the political economy of public expen-
ditures and debts, section 3 argues that state governments can be expected to overestimate 
tax revenues in election as well as non-election years. A higher degree of overestimation is 
expected when re-election is uncertain. These hypotheses are tested in section 4, using panel 
data from 10 West German states between 1992 and 2002. The results are discussed in sec-
tion 5. 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1 Fiscal autonomy of German states 
In Germany, each state has its own parliament and government elected every four or five 
years. A number of important tasks are decided upon and carried out on the level of the indi-
vidual state. This includes material infrastructure like local and regional roads, and institutional 
infrastructure like public education, theatres and large parts of the juridical system and police. 
The states furthermore grant subsidies for numerous purposes, such as environmental protec-
tion, cultural issues etc. In sum, German states provide a large part of those public goods and 
services which are directly observed and felt by the state citizens in their every-day life. Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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Though the constitution defines minimum requirements for a number of the states’ tasks, the 
individual state government has some autonomy to set different emphases within the range of 
these tasks.  
At the same time, the individual states only have a very limited autonomy when it comes to 
collecting revenues. Next to the revenues from a number of fiscally minor taxes, they receive a 
fixed share of the overall income and turnover tax raised in their territory. Until 1996, the states 
furthermore collected the revenue from a property tax. However, both tax base and rate were 
not determined by the individual state but fixed nationwide. The individual state does not have 
the opportunity to change the tax base or rate of any significant tax. It can merely indirectly 
increase tax revenues by spurring the regional economy. However, these measures only affect 
revenues in the medium term perspective. In addition, the German states are part of a system 
of fiscal equalization which largely equalizes the differences in tax revenues among them. In 
the late 1990s, one additional Deutsche Mark of tax revenues collected within the borders of a 
state increased the same state’s budget by less than 10 Pfennig (Scherf, 2000: 84-87). Con-
sequently, even the indirect way by which a state government can influence tax revenues is 
very restricted. Other than taxes, public charges serve as the only other regular source of pub-
lic funds, apart from debts. The freedom of disposition is low for both types of revenue. In sum, 
the individual state government faces a sum of revenues which, at least in the short-term per-
spective, is largely fixed exogenously.  
2.2 Tax Projections in the German states 
The AKS consists of independent workgroups from seven leading research institutes, the 
German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat), the Federal Bureau of Statistics, 
the Bundesbank and experts from the ministries of finance on the federal and state level. 
Within the AKS, each workgroup carries out its own, independent projection for all taxes sepa-
rately. When developing the economic scenario for their projections, they are, however, 
obliged to use a number of informational inputs delivered by the federal government. First, 
these inputs concern the overall expected economic development, expressed in key figures 
like the expected growth rate, the rate of unemployment etc. All projections have to be based 
on this input (e.g., Gebhardt, 2001). Second, the members of AKS are provided with binding 
estimates for the expected impact of the latest changes in tax legislation. Based on the differ-
ent workgroups’ projections, the AKS works out and publishes an official projection which has 
to be passed in a consensus among the scientific units and governmental experts. The official 
result states the expected tax revenues by type of tax and level of government (e.g., Gebhardt, 
2001; Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2003).  
The AKS meets twice a year. In spring of each year, it publishes tax projections for the follow-
ing five years as well as a revised estimate for the current year. In fall, the AKS provides pro-
jections for the current and the following year. The federal government is obliged to use the 
latest AKS projections in its budget process (e.g., von der Lippe, 1998).  Based on the AKS 
results for all states, a sub-committee called “Unterausschuss Regionalisierung” and chaired 
by the ministry of finance of the state Baden-Württemberg calculates the tax revenues that the Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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individual states can expect. The state governments are informed about these so-called “re-
gionalized tax projections”. The “regionalized tax projections” are not binding for the states in 
their own budgetary planning process, but merely serve as a point of reference. Each state 
government can adjust the projections if it considers them inappropriate. Neither the public nor 
the members of state parliament have access to the results of the “regionalized projection” 
(e.g., Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2003). Thus they have no possibility to judge whether 
adjustments are made and if so, whether they are grounded on convincing arguments.  
3. Incentives for manipulating tax projections – a public choice approach 
The previous section illustrated two fundamental facts about the situation of state governments 
in Germany. First, the individual state government has no possibility to change the tax burden 
of the citizens within its territory. With respect to the budget, its freedom of movement is pri-
marily restricted to the expenditures’ side. Second, the state government has the possibility to 
manipulate tax projections. The question to be addressed now is whether they make use of 
this possibility and if so, what the emerging pattern of manipulations is.  
To the knowledge of the authors, the literature does not contain a public choice approach 
which explicitly deals with tax projections. On the other hand, there is a rich body of literature 
on the political economy of public expenditures (for instance van Dalen and Swank, 1996; Galli 
and Rossi, 2002) and of public debts (for instance Persson and Svensson, 1989; Roubini and 
Sachs, 1989; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990; Pettersson-Lidblom, 2001). This literature is relevant 
for a public choice approach to tax projections because overestimated tax projections are a 
substitute for explicit deficits. A government which reports overestimated tax revenues in its 
budget can include higher expenditures without openly having to increase public debt. Alterna-
tively, it can reduce explicit deficits without cutting expenditures. Following the literature, this 
possibility can be valuable for an incumbent party in two ways. First, it can use overestimated 
tax projections to increase its chance of being re-elected. Second, if re-election seems uncer-
tain or even unlikely, it can bring forward future expenditures which are favourable to its con-
stituents or impose budgetary restrictions on future governments. These possibilities will be 
discussed in section 3.1 and 3.2 consecutively. 
3.1 Tax projections and the struggle for re-election 
The following passages argue that manipulated tax projections can help the incumbent party in 
its struggle for re-election. The course of argumentation proceeds in three steps. First, it is 
argued that the state government can increase its chance of being re-elected by stating higher 
expenditures in the election years. Second, biased tax projections are a suitable means to 
allow the state government to increase expenditures. And third, it does not have to fear legal 
punishment or a durable decline in popularity if its tax projections turn out not to be tenable.  
Coming to the first step, the relationship between government expenditures and the probability 
for the incumbent party to become re-elected has to be analysed. In modern democracies, the 
electoral success of a party depends to a considerable extent on the support of interest groups 
(e.g., Potters and Sloof, 1996). Many interest groups press the government for additional ex-Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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penditures in their field of interest. On a state level, environmental groups demand more natu-
ral reservoirs, cultural groups may press for more subsidies for theatres and business groups 
will demand improved infrastructure. As the German states employ a large number of civil ser-
vants, labor unions can exert pressure on the state government to raise wages and/or improve 
working conditions. The higher the expenditures an interest group expects from the govern-
ment, the higher will be the support that the corresponding party receives in the election race 
(e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1996).  
In addition to responding to political pressure by interest groups, the state government can try 
to increase its popularity by addressing different groups of voters directly. In this respect, state 
expenditures that improve the quality of living in the voters’ living areas can be expected to 
increase the state government’s popularity (e.g., Bischoff, 2005). Belt ways as well as addi-
tional police and teachers are typical examples of state expenditures that prove popular 
among many voters. The large number of civil servants represents an important group of vot-
ers (e.g., Frey and Pommerehne, 1982). By increasing their wages and/or improving their 
working conditions, the incumbent party can increase its popularity within this group of voters 
directly. On the other hand, cuts in expenditures are very unpopular among voters and interest 
groups, especially if they do not go along with a reduction in tax burden. As the parties on the 
state level cannot offer the latter, any reduction in expenditures will lead to uncompensated 
utility losses among the former beneficiaries. At the same time, the government cannot expect 
an increase in popularity among other voters who would benefit from the reduced tax burden. 
Therefore, cuts in expenditures can be expected to reduce the popularity of a state govern-
ment.  
The next question to be addressed is to what extent a manipulation of tax projections can help 
the state government to launch favourable expenditure programmes. For this purpose, it is 
necessary to look at the timing of tax projections, budget process, government spending and 
elections. Let t be the election year. The budget for period t is planned in t-1 and thus based 
on the tax projections made in t-1. By overestimating the tax revenues for t, the state govern-
ment can promise higher expenditures in the election year t without having to plan for a higher 
deficit. Thereby, the state government can first circumvent constitutional restrictions on defi-
cits. Second, the incumbent can justify higher expenditures without expelling those voters who 
are concerned about the sustainability of its policy. In times when the electorate has become 
increasingly aware of the growing public debts (e.g., Mueller, 2003: 466-469), this way of 
avoiding explicit deficits becomes increasingly important. As an important side-effect, the 
overestimated sum of tax revenues can by itself increase the popularity of the incumbents 
party because it indicates that the state government has been successful in fostering eco-
nomic progress within the state’s borders, e.g. by attracting new firms. Thus, in the phase of 
budgetary planning and parliamentary discussion in t-1, an overestimated tax projection will – Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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In the beginning of the election year t, the government can start to put through the overesti-
mated budget. This will have a positive influence on its probability of being re-elected. In May 
of the year t, the new tax projections are published for the federal level and all states in total. 
As the regionalized estimates are not published, the bias in the tax projections from t-1 does 
not become obvious immediately. Consequently, this date does not affect the government 
popularity in a negative way. In most cases, the bias can be expected to be revealed no earlier 
than in the end of t or the beginning of t+1, i.e. after the elections are held. In t+1 or even later, 
the budgetary policy is subject to an ex post revision by the state auditing institution (“Landes-
rechnungshof”). Its legal power as well as its influence on public opinion is, however, very lim-
ited (e.g., Korthals, 2002). In sum, the incumbent party must not fear any negative conse-
quences from publishing an upward biased tax projection for the election year. Thus, it can be 
expected to do so.  
For non-election years overestimated tax projections cannot be expected because they do not 
serve the government’s purpose. Especially if voters are myopic, the gains in popularity in 
these years will not help the government in the election year (e.g., Nannenstad and Paldam, 
1994; van Dalen and Swank, 1996; Galli and Rossi, 2002). In addition, they reduce the gov-
ernment’s freedom of movement with respect to the budget in the election year. 
3.2 Tax projections in the face of defeat 
The above passage assumed that the incumbent sees a fair chance of re-election and ma-
nipulates tax projections to increase this chance. The literature on the strategic use of deficits 
suggests that similar manipulations can be expected even if re-election is unlikely. Tabellini 
and Alesina (1990) argue that the median voter of the preceding election cannot be sure that 
he will be decisive in the next election. Therefore he cannot be sure that the bundle of public 
goods and services in the next term fits his preferences to the same extent the current bundle 
does. Consequently, he may prefer to bring forward certain crucial expenditures planned for 
the future while he still has influence on public expenditures. In order to finance these extra 
expenditures in the current term, the median voter may prefer public deficits even if in general, 
he favors balanced budgets. The incentive to run deficits is higher the smaller the probability 
that the current median voter is decisive again and the more polarized the distribution of pref-
erences among voters is. In the context of this paper, this course of argumentation can be 
translated as follows: The incumbent party can serve its own constituents – represented by the 
                                                 
1
   For central governments, the positive effects of high expenditures on the incumbent’s popularity are argued 
to result from their impact on employment and output (e.g., Hibbs, 1977; Persson and Tabellini, 1997) or 
positive effects of signalling competence (e.g.,  Rogoff, 1990). German state governments cannot count on 
similar effects of notable size. Instead, the rise in popularity has to result from the direct positive effects of an 
increased supply in public goods and services respectively higher subsidies. Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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median voter of the preceding election – by bringing forward expenditures originally planned 
for future terms. By overstating expected tax revenues, they are given the opportunity to serve 
their constituents without violating constitutional restrictions on deficits or further reducing their 
chance of election through higher deficits (see section 3.1).  
Persson and Svensson (1989) provide another argument why incumbents should overstate tax 
projections if re-election is unlikely. It applied to what they call “stubborn conservative govern-
ments” which want to prevent their left-wing successor from increasing public expenditures in 
fields which the conservatives consider unnecessary or even harmful. Persson and Svensson 
argue that the stubborn conservative government can do so by running high deficits while still 
in office. This will increase the future burden of interest payments and thereby reduce the suc-
cessors’ possibilities to increase expenditures (see also Pettersson-Lidbom, 2001; Sutter, 
2003). Given constitutional restrictions on deficits and the fact that German state governments 
cannot lower taxes, manipulated tax projections seem an appropriate means to this end.  
Just like the arguments put forth in section 3.1, the considerations in this section suggest that 
incumbents will overestimate tax projections in election years. The incentives to overestimate 
are higher the lower the incumbents popularity among the electorate and thus its chance of re-
election. With respect to non-election years, this section leads to a different conclusion than 
section 3.1 does. As the median voter can never be sure to be decisive in the next election, 
the incentive to bring forward expenditures is existent in all years of government. Given the 
constitutional restrictions on deficits, the overestimation of tax projections seems an appropri-
ate means to this end. On the other hand, overestimated tax projections in non-election years 
may have a negative influence on the incumbent’s chance to be re-elected because voters can 
observe the manipulations before the election is held. Therefore, the incentives to overstate 
tax projections are lower for non-election years than they are for election years. Nevertheless, 
they may remain positive, especially if the incumbent is currently unpopular.  
3.3 Rationality of voters 
Many public choice approaches to public expenditures and deficits implicitly or explicitly as-
sumed myopic and non-rational voters who suffered from fiscal illusion (e.g., Hibbs, 1977; 
Nannenstad and Paldam, 1994). Other models are based on a different conviction. Among 
others, Rogoff (1990) points out that it is not self-evident that voters should be naïve enough to 
be fooled by the same trick again and again. Instead, voters will learn to anticipate the incum-
bents’ behavior. In this case, an increase in public expenditures and deficits in pre-election 
years will no longer help regional governments to attract additional votes.
2
 In the context of 
this paper, however, the question whether voters are rational or not is of minor importance. To 
                                                 
2
   Rogoff (1990) argues that deficits can serve as signals for the incumbent’s competence and thereby still 
exert some influence on voters’ behavior even if they are rational. His course of argumentation does, how-
ever, apply to national governments whose budgetary behavior influences overall output, unemployment and 
inflation. In the context of this paper, this argument is of minor importance and thus not followed further. Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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illustrate this, let us first turn to the course of argumentation which sees overestimated tax pro-
jections as an instrument to increase the chance of re-election (see section 3.1). If votes are 
myopic and non-rational, manipulated tax projections can help the incumbent to increase state 
expenditures and thereby attract additional votes. If, on the other hand, voters are rational, 
they will expect tax revenues to be overstated regardless of whether the actual projections are 
really overstated or not. In the given institutional framework, there is no way in which the gov-
ernment can convince them that its projections are not biased. Thus, when trying to estimate 
the true tax revenues, rational voters will correct the official figures downwards. If rational vot-
ers use these corrected tax projection as a measure of the incumbent’s competence, the in-
cumbent will reduce his chance of re-election if he publishes unbiased tax projections, be-
cause voters will correct them in the same way they would correct biased estimates. Thus, 
regardless of the degree of voters’ rationality, the incentives for the incumbent to overstate tax 
projections for the election year remain. In non-election years, overestimated tax projections 
do not help the incumbent to increase its chance of winning if voters are non-rational and my-
opic. On the contrary, they may even be harmful (see section 3.1). If voters are rational and 
forward-looking, they do not account for expenditures in previous years when making their 
voting decision. Thus, the government cannot increase its chance of re-election by overesti-
mating tax projections for non-election years either. The arguments put forth in section 3.2 
work for both rational and non-rational voters because the intention to overestimate taxes is 
not to influence voters but to bring forward expenditures to serve the median voter of the pre-
ceding election. In sum, the conclusions drawn in sections 3.1 and 3.2 do not differ fundamen-
tally regardless of whether voters are assumed to be rational or not. 
Together with the institutional framework laid out in section 2 the considerations put forth in 
this section lead to the following hypotheses: State governments can be expected to overesti-
mate tax revenues for the election year. In non-election years, the incentives to overestimate 
are smaller but may still remain positive. Thus no clear prediction can be made concerning the 
bias of tax projections in non-election years.  
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Variables  
The hypotheses stated above are tested using data on the tax projections of all 10 West Ger-
man states from 1992 to 2002.
3
 Due to a number of features, this data set is highly suitable for 
this purpose. First, it is not necessary to account for differences in the political institutions and 
processes among the German states, as these are largely identical (e.g., Galli and Rossi, 
2002). Second, the same tax legislation and thus the same change in tax legislation apply to 
all states. Finally, all states base their own tax projections on the same nationwide projection 
                                                 
3
   Berlin is excluded due to its special status. The starting point of the data set is chosen because the 1992 
budget was the first budget which was based on tax projections made after the German unification. Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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made by the AKS. To capture the degree of over- respectively underestimation, the ratio of 
projected and actual tax revenues of state s in year t (RPAst) is used as dependent variable. A 
value of RPAst > 1 points at an upward bias, RPAst < 1 at a downward bias in tax projections. 
The values for RPAst ranged from 0.917 to 1.161. Of 110 tax projections included in the data 
set, 73 report an an RPAst > 1 while in the remaining 37 cases, RPAst < 1 (see figure 1). All 
states reach average values of RPAst above 1 and the overall average across all states and 
years takes on a value of 1.027, with 1.037 for election years and 1.025 for non-election years. 
This result gives a first hint at a general upward bias in the tax projections of West German 
states.  































The AKS delivers estimates for the sum of state taxes across all states for each year. The cor-
responding ratio of projected and actual tax revenues in year t RPAAKSt is the first explanatory 
variable (RPA_AKS).
4
 The AKS estimates are underestimated in five years and overestimated 
in six of the eleven years between 1992 and 2002 (see figure 1). The average RPAAKSt is only 
                                                 
4
   Below, the estimates produced in fall of the previous year are used. In all relevant years, these were pub-
lished before the state parliaments passed their official budget from which the projected taxes of the states 
were taken. Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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1.0139 with a minimum of 0.975 and a maximum of 1.057. Figure 2 traces the RPAAKSt  as well 
as the minimum, maximum and median RPAst for each year between 1992 and 2002. The 
latter variables show fluctuations which are highly synchronous to the fluctuations in RPAAKSt. 
This indicates that the AKS-estimates serve as the starting point for tax projections on the 
state level. The median RPAst exceeds the RPAAKSt in six out of eleven years but the distance 
between the two is generally larger for these six years than it is for those five years when the 
median state underestimated tax revenues. In addition, the difference between the maximum 
RPAst and RPAAKSt is substantially larger than the difference between the minimum RPAst and 
RPAAKSt (with exception of 1992). In sum, the comparison of the tax projections published by 
AKS and the tax projections published by the individual states further nourishes the notion of a 
general upward bias in tax projections on the state level.  



















As postulated in section 3, the state government can be expected to overstate the projected 
tax revenues especially for the election year. An election year dummy (ELECTYR) is intro-
duced to capture this effect and is expected to produce a positive coefficient. In the relevant 
period of observation, the state governments were either dominated by the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) or the Christian Democrats (CDU; CSU in Bavaria). In order to account for the Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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impact of stubborn conservative governments and possible other partisan effects (e.g., Hibbs, 
1977; Volkering and de Haan, 2001), a rightwing-dummy (CDU) is included. The fact that the 
Bavarian government is run by a purely regional party which is associated with the CDU on the 
federal level but pursues its own policies on the regional level led the authors to include a spe-
cial dummy for this state (BAVARIA).  
In those cases when SPD or CDU/CSU did not form a single-party government, they were the 
dominant partner in a coalition government with a smaller party (e.g. Liberal Democrats (FDP) 
or the Green Party). Coalitions between the two large parties are exceptions. The theoretical 
literature suggests that coalition governments make higher expenditures because they have 
more interest groups and groups of voters to satisfy (e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Volkering 
and de Haan, 2001) than single-party governments. Thus, coalition governments can be ex-
pected to make use of the possibility to overstate tax revenues more heavily. The regression 
approach below accounts for the impact of coalition governments by introducing a dummy 
(COAL). An FDP-dummy is included to account for possible impacts of the different small coa-
lition partners.  
Virtually all theoretical approaches introduced in section 3 suggest that the willingness to pre-
sent an overestimated projection for the election year is higher the less popular the state gov-
ernment is. In addition, section 3.2 suggests that incumbents may overstate projected tax 
revenues even in non-election years if its popularity is low. Unfortunately, there are no regular 
opinion polls on the state level to capture the popularity of state governments. On the other 
hand, there is detailed information on the popularity of parties on the federal level. As the state 
government’s probability of getting re-elected strongly depends on the popularity of the party 
on the federal level, the corresponding popularity figure will hereafter serve as an explanatory 
variable. More specifically, the “Skalometer”-scores of the two large parties are used. Therein, 
a representative sample of voters is asked to assign grades between +5 and -5 to the SPD 
and CDU. For each state government, the average grade scored by the incumbent party on 
the federal level is used as a proxy for its popularity (SKALGOV).
5
 The higher this score, the 
more likely a government is to become re-elected and thus the smaller the incentives for ma-
nipulating tax projections. To capture the special importance of SKALGOV in election years, 
the regressions below will introduce the product of SKALGOV and ELECTYR as an independ-
ent variable. A negative coefficient is expected. The product of SKALGOV and CDU is intro-
duced to capture the role of “stubborn conservative governments”. Again, a negative sign is 
expected.  
Hamburg and Bremen are so-called “Stadtstaaten”, i.e. states with only one municipality. Their 
governments have to fulfil both state and municipal tasks simultaneously. The tax projections 
                                                 
5
   In the case of coalition governments, the grade of the larger party is used. For grand coalitions between 
SPD and CDU, the average grade of the two large parties is used. Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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are more complex because they have to incorporate local as well as regional taxes. A special 
dummy (CITY) is introduced to control for the special status of Hamburg and Bremen. Some 
states pass what is called a “Doppelhaushalt”, i.e. a state budget which is fixed for two rather 
than only one year. In this case, the tax projections for the second year are not made one but 
two years in advance. Other than the projections for the next year, the tax projections by the 
AKS for two years ahead are regularly upward biased because they are based on a deliber-
ately optimistic development scenario (e.g., Schulze-Steikow, 1996 in connection to Auerbach, 
1996). If the state government does not correct this bias, it will present an upward biased tax 
projection for the second year of the “Doppelhaushalt”. A special dummy is introduced to ac-
count for this fact (DOPPELHH). It takes on the value 1 for the second year of a “Doppel-
haushalt” and zero in all other cases.  
Table 1 contains the correlation matrix for the variables described above. Except for the com-
pound variable SKALGOV x ELECTYR, the correlation coefficients of explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable show the expected signs. The strong direct correlation between 
RPAst and RPAAKSt (0.607) stresses the importance of AKS-inputs for the states’ tax projec-
tions, while the coefficients for CDU and ELECTYR point at a weak influence on the depend-
ent variable. The compound variables (SKALGOV x ELECTYR  and  SKALGOV x CDU)  are 
highly correlated with their dummy components. Apart from that, the correlation among ex-
planatory variables is moderate.   
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Table 1: Matrix of correlation 







COAL CDU  FDP  BAY  CITY  SKALGOV 
x CDU 
RPAst 
1.000  0.607  -0.226 0.101 0.076 0.118  0.079  -0.104 -0.039 -0.133  0.204  -0.166 
RPA_AKS 
0.607 1.000  -0.107  -0.073 -0.036 -0.048 -0.009 0.042 0.043 0.000 0.000  -0.025 
SKALGOV 
-0.226 -0.107  1.000  0.005  0.261  -0.249  0.041 -0.617  -0.090  -0.395 0.071  -0.169 
ELECTYR 
0.101 -0.073  0.005  1.000  0.862  0.148 -0.056 -0.065 -0.065 -0.022 0.022  -0.165 
SKALGOV x 
ELECTYR  0.076 -0.036  0.261  0.862  1.000  -0.031 -0.024 -0.221 -0.066 -0.168 0.068  -0.130 
DOPPELHH 
0.118 -0.048  -0.249  0.148  -0.031  1.000 -0.094 0.233 0.123 0.301 -0.069  0.159 
COAL 
0.079 -0.009  0.041  -0.056  -0.024  -0.094 1.000 -0.244 0.426 -0.424 0.299  -0.187 
CDU 
-0.104 0.042  -0.617  -0.065  -0.221  0.233 -0.244  1.000  0.224  0.615  -0.217 0.721 
FDP 
-0.039 0.043  -0.090  -0.065  -0.066  0.123 0.426  0.224  1.000  -0.181  0.000 0.148 
BAY 
-0.133 0.000  -0.395  -0.022  -0.168  0.301 -0.424 0.615 -0.181 1.000 -0.167  0.416 
CITY 
0.204 0.000  0.071  0.022  0.068  -0.069 0.299 -0.217 0.000 -0.167 1.000  -0.157 
SKALGOV x 
CDU  -0.166 -0.025  -0.169  -0.165  -0.130  0.159 -0.187  0.721  0.148  0.416  -0.157 1.000 
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4.2 Regression results 
A linear balanced panel regression approach is chosen to explain the RPAst across West 
German 10 states in the years 1992 to 2002. The results are reported in table 2. The variables 
COAL and FDP are omitted after proving insignificant in all tested set-ups. In all regressions, 
acceptable coefficients of determination, highly significant F-statistics and clearly insignificant 
values of Ramsey’s RESET2 test indicate that the linear approach is adequate. The residuals 
appear to be normally distributed by Anderson-Darling (AD) test and far off from being serially 
correlated (see Durbin-Watson-statistics). The Chow tests (Chow Prob) point at individual ef-
fects and the results of Hausman’s test (H Prob) clearly supports the random-effect model 
chosen here.  
As suggested in the preliminary analyses in section 4.1, RPAAKS is highly significant in each 
model. SKALGOV proves significant and produces the expected negative sign in all models. 
The ELECTYR-dummy has the expected positive sign but fails to be significant. The coeffi-
cients for the compound variable SKALGOV x ELECTYR have the wrong sign but remains 
insignificant. Both partisan variables CDU and SKALGOV x CDU are not significant. The BA-
VARIA-dummy shows the expected negative sign but fails to be significant in the majority of 
models. Finally, CITY and DOPPELHH on the other hand exert a significantly positive influ-
ence on the states’ tax projections in all models.   
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Table 2: Regression results 














































































































CDU        -0.0256 
(-1.793) 
  




          
2 R   0.4353 0.4401 0.4282 0.4122 0.3900 0.4495 0.4318 0.4360 
F value  12.77***  14.68***  16.27***  18.28*** 20.89*** 12.02*** 11.33*** 12.79*** 
RESET2  0.41 0.42 0.29 0.17 0.03 3.16 0.68 0.62 
|C| 0.1565  0.8782  0.9307  0.9749 0.9816 0.1158 0.1326 0.8190 
Cond No  8.2189  7.7867  7.0144  5.20079  5.2536 6.7348 6.7716 7.3977 
AD    0.387 0.315 0.292 0.384 0.567 0.229 0.336 0.289 
DW    2.044 2.034 2.053 2.154 2.137 1.751 2.042 2.041 
Chow Prob  0.0087  0.0085  0.0130 0.0004 0.0014 0.0265 0.0149 0.0145 
H Prob  0.9962  0.9949  0.9765  0.9717 0.9317 0.9858 0.9936 0.9983 
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5. Discussion 
The previous section 4 provides an empirical test of a public choice approach to the accuracy 
of tax projection in German states between 1992 and 2002. The theoretical considerations in 
section 3 lead to two major hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that state governments will 
present an upward biased estimate for the election year in order to increase state expendi-
tures and thereby improve their chance of re-election. According to the second hypothesis, the 
overestimation is not restricted to election years but can be expected throughout the entire 
government term. It is not driven by the desire to improve the chances of re-election. Instead 
the uncertainty of re-election leads state governments to bring forward crucial expenditures. 
As a consequence, they will run systematic deficits regardless of the proximity of elections.  
The empirical results in section 4 first suggest that state governments take the AKS-estimates 
as a starting point for their own projections. If the AKS overestimates (underestimates) overall 
tax revenues, the individual states are more likely to overestimate (underestimate) their own 
tax revenues. With respect to the two hypotheses, the empirical results give no support to the 
first hypothesis. Neither the election year dummy nor the product of SKALGOV x ELECTYR 
proved to have any influence. At the same time, the empirical results are largely in line with the 
second hypothesis. The general tendency to overestimate tax projections revealed by the de-
scriptive empirics in section 4.1 provides the first piece of evidence in this respect. Second, the 
positive estimate for “DOPPELHH” indicates that state governments who have to pass a two-
year budget were content to receive overestimated tax projections from the AKS and saw no 
need to correct them. The most striking support is, however, provided by the negative and 
highly significant relationship between the incumbent party’s popularity (SKALGOV) and the 
RPA which does not depend on the proximity of elections but applies to the full term. It clearly 
shows the upward bias in tax projections is higher the lower the incumbent party’s popularity. 
The lower its popularity, the more important it is to bring forward important expenditures origi-
nally scheduled for future terms. To this end, overestimated tax projections are an adequate 
measure because they help to circumvent constitutional restrictions of public deficits. The poor 
performance of COAL, FDP and CDU-dummies suggest that this behavior applies to left- and 
right-wing parties alike, regardless of whether they are leading a coalition or running a single-
party government. The special impact of stubborn conservative governments suggested by 
Persson and Svensson (1989) is not supported by the current evidence.  
Though weak in its significance, the performance of the BAVARIA dummy supports the sec-
ond hypothesis and rejects the impact of stubborn conservative government. Bavaria is the 
only German state which has been run by the same single-party government over the last 40 
years. All other states have witnessed one or more changes in government. In addition, the 
majorities of the incumbent party are, on average, much more comfortable than those of other 
governments. Thus, Bavarian governments have much less need to overestimate tax projec-
tions regardless of which motivation may drive them. The exceptionally high popularity of the Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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CSU in Bavaria cannot be captured by the SKALGOV, because the latter represents the popu-
larity of the CDU, the large “sister-party” of the Bavarian CSU.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper provides an empirical analysis of tax projections in West German states. An outline 
of the institutional background under which German state governments make their tax projec-
tions shows two features: First, state governments have virtually no influence on their actual 
tax revenues. Thus, expenditures are the only variable part of the regular state budget. Sec-
ond, state governments have considerable influence on the projected sum of taxes used in the 
budget process. While there is no literature on the political economy of tax projections, the 
existing public choice literature on public expenditures and debts can be reinterpreted. The 
reinterpretation leads to a number of hypotheses which were tested using panel data for 10 
West German states between 1992 and 2002. The results of this empirical analysis give 
strong support to the public choice approach to tax projections. They suggest that the tax pro-
jections published by state governments have a general upward bias. While neither elections 
nor partisanship affects the degree of overestimation, the incumbent’s popularity is found to 
have a strong influence. The less popular the incumbent’s party is and thus the less likely it is 
to become re-elected, the higher the degree of overestimation in tax revenues. This result 
supports the notion according to which the uncertainty of re-election leads governments to 
accept deficits in order to bring forward expenditures originally planned for future terms. The 
particular charm of manipulating tax projections for this purpose lies in the fact that – unlike 
open deficits – they are invisible ex ante. Thus, constitutional restrictions on public deficits do 
not apply to them. In addition, they are likely to be less harmful to the incumbent’s perceived 
valence and thus popularity. 
The empirical results discussed above prove that neither the parliament, nor the public, nor the 
state auditing institutions are able to effectively prevent the state government from manipulat-
ing tax projections. As the public and parliamentary debate on the budget process is based on 
unreliable inputs in the essential field of tax projections, the public and parliamentary control 
over the state budget is reduced significantly and constitutional restrictions on public deficits 
are weakened. In order to strengthen the position of public and parliament in the budget proc-
ess and reinstall effective constitutional constraints, the transparency of the budget process 
has to be increased (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996). For this purpose, it is necessary to pub-
lish the regionalized tax projections calculated by the “Unterausschuss Regionalisierung” of 
the AKS. As this committee is controlled by the state governments rather than independent 
officials, it is furthermore advisable to publish the share-out key by which the sum of state tax 
revenues estimated by the AKS is divided among states. Given this information, the public and 
especially the members of parliament can compare the AKS estimates and the projection 
made by the state government. The state government is forced to publicly justify any deviation, 
especially an increase with respect to the AKS estimates. Next to improving the democratic 
control of state governments, this reform will also increase the effectiveness of the ex post 
control by the state auditing institutions. In the current times of severe budgetary shortage, Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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high unemployment and fierce distributional struggles, the incentives to manipulate tax projec-
tions are stronger and thus the institutional reforms suggested above become even more im-
portant (e.g., von Hagen and Harden, 1994; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Neck and Getzner, 
2001). Unlike many other reforms which are currently discussed in Germany, the suggested 
changes are very easy to implement, in particular because they do not cause additional costs 
for the public.  Ivo Bischoff / Wolfgang Gohout  Tax projections in German states 
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